Congress just approved $12.5 billion for rebuilding the national air traffic control system. It’s a down payment on what may cost over $31 billion to complete. While the initial funding is an excellent move toward modernization and addressing staffing shortages, it’s only the first step and will require more political willpower to push through.
The New York Times recently accused the private aviation industry of not paying its “fair share” into the system, which was promptly debunked by the NBAA. The argument for or against privatization shouldn’t be based on sensationalized headlines, but rather a rational, fact-based discussion.
As a former Part 135 operator, the idea of privatizing air traffic control was a no-go for me. I thought this was mostly airline jealousy wanting us “little guys” to pay more for the system or take more control of the ATC system for their gains, squeezing us out in the process.
The last serious effort to privatize in 2018 was met with statements from NBAA such as: “For more than 20 years, several big airlines have sought to seize control of our nation’s air traffic control system so they can effectively determine where and when general aviation operators can fly. These airlines want the ability to control where investments in our aviation system are made which represents a significant threat to general aviation.”
At that time, NBAA countered the argument to modernize equipment, saying: “According to the FAA Administrator, over the past five years, NextGen has delivered benefits to the aviation industry and traveling public that are on time and on budget… In recent Congressional testimony, the President of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association said, ‘The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) is the safest, most efficient, most complex, and most diverse system in the world.’”
It’s been a long time since 2018, and the facts have changed. Controller shortages have widened, modernization has been delayed, and recent accidents and incidents have raised questions about whether our current structure can keep pace.
On Jan. 29, 2025, the illusion of “the safest” system in the world was shaken when a U.S. Army helicopter and an American Airlines flight collided over the Potomac River near Washington D.C. killing everyone on board.
NTSB Investigator on the crash, Todd Innman, spoke through tears saying, “we have several hundred recommendations open for aviation. You want to do something about it? Adopt the recommendations of the NTSB, you’ll save lives. Get up and do something. I don’t want to have to meet with another set of those parents like that again.”
While the investigation is ongoing, the preliminary report showed “a review of commercial operations (instrument flight rules departures or arrivals) at DCA between October 2021 and December 2024 indicated a total of 944,179 operations. During that time, there were 15,214 occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nm and vertical separation of less than 400 ft.,” according to the NTSB.
Midair collisions are rare, and the accident cannot be attributed solely to the air traffic control system; however, it has served as a catalyst to bring the outdated air traffic control technology and understaffing of controllers to the forefront of the public’s mind. While no governance model can eliminate all accidents, a structure like a nonprofit agency with consistent, long-term funding could address systemic staffing and technology gaps.
Efforts To Modernize
ATC modernization has been a long-term goal. One of the more spectacular failed federal procurement efforts was the Advanced Automation System, an attempt to modernize controller stations and software in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1988, the project was expected to cost $2.5 billion. By 1994, it had ballooned to $7.6 billion, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), with most projects being cancelled or restructured after spending $1.5 billion. Other projects, such as Wide Area Augmentation Systems and STARS, saw their costs triple from the 1990s to 2011.
NextGen, has had its own set of challenges. A National Research Council (NRC) report stated: “the FAA’s NextGen program had not developed adequate plans to achieve fundamental transformations of the National Airspace System (NAS), including decommissioning surveillance radars and automating air traffic control processes.” In 2024, an Office of the Inspector General report stated: “While obstacles remain, including community noise concerns and lack of controller automation tools, FAA has made significant progress implementing high value advanced flight procedures through its metroplex program.”
Long-term capital planning requires consistency. When air traffic control is subject to political whims, both the system and its users suffer.
Ever-Changing Budget Priorities
The National Air Space Safety Review Team (NAS SRT) submitted a report to the FAA administrator in 2023, commissioned due to increases in serious runway incursions. While they cite excellent organizational culture, they claim most of “these challenges, in the areas of process integrity, staffing, and facilities, equipment, and technology, all have ties to inadequate, inconsistent funding.”
The FAA is in an unfortunate position of being subject to the whims of Congress. We see this in the constantly changing leadership, as new presidents select their chosen administrators, and in the push and pull of FAA reauthorization bills that occur every five years. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy is a champion of revitalizing the ATC system today, but what happens in the next election cycle when the projects are underway and over budget?
Airlines and Part 135 air carriers pay federal excise taxes, and all aircraft pay fuel taxes to fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which typically covers a little over half of the FAA’s budget (depending on the year). The rest relies on Congressional approval.
Beyond federal excise and fuel taxes, airlines and private operators are already paying a heavy price for air traffic controller shortages and antiquated systems. Delays cost operators high fuel bills when they are rerouted across New York state to reach Teterboro, and angry passengers out of south Florida are held for departure when Jacksonville Center can’t handle the traffic flow due to a lack of controllers.
Is Private Better?
Nav Canada is the air traffic organization responsible for managing Canadian airspace; it was established as a private, non-profit corporation in 1996. It charges user fees to run its system, around $1.2 billion Canadian dollars annually. General aviation holds a seat on Nav Canada’s board, and costs are tiered based on aircraft weight and frequency of operations.
While Nav Canada has its own issues with controller staffing, and no model is perfect, it leads in technology development. ADS-B rollout there has been arguably more successful than in the U.S., and the organization is the first in the world to introduce space-based ADS-B tracking in 2019.
The U.S. is now in the minority as a partially taxpayer-funded air traffic control system; in its Document 9082, ICAO recommended that air navigation services should be autonomous and separated from state controls for many reasons, including financial autonomy and long-term planning. Many countries have shifted to public-private partnerships, nonprofits, and other models that create independent boards that decide how to collect funding and spend it wisely. The risk of airline control and ballooning costs for general aviation is real due to imbalances in scale, but with proper controls, it can be mitigated.
To pretend general aviation isn’t already paying for ATC staffing and technology shortfalls in increased safety risks and delays is shortsighted. Next time the discussion arises, let’s approach it with an open mind and engage in a thoughtful conversation. Our system is long overdue for real enhancements and upgrades. Privatization could mean longer-lasting financial support and commitment to long technology horizons, but it must come with careful governance design that doesn’t squeeze out GA. Let’s at least consider it.
Jessie Naor is founder and president of the Private Aviation Safety Alliance, a nonprofit organization advancing transparency in private aviation (www.flyingprivate.org). Previously, she served as president of GrandView Aviation .
The Airbus A330-800neo is one of two variants in the Airbus A330neo family, with the other being the A330-900neo. The A330neo is an upgrade over the original A330 variants, with new engines, updated wingtips, interior improvements, and software upgrades. The A330-900, directly succeeding the A330-300, has proven effective and has even found love in the United Statesat Delta Air Lines. Contrastingly, the A330-800 has been shunned in the US.
In some ways, you can consider the start of the A330neo to be the original A350 program. To compete against the Boeing 787, Airbus took the A330 family and added new engines along with a carbon-composite wing and a new cockpit. Airlines largely rejected the concept, prompting Airbus to create a clean-sheet aircraft, the A350 XWB, and move up in size. The A330neo was developed in the 2010s to slot underneath the A350 in price and capability.
The Airlines That Don’t Want The Airbus A330-800
Photo: Dirk Daniel Mann | Shutterstock
The A330-800 is Airbus’s smallest widebody, and given that the US is home to more Boeing 767s (a similarly-sized twinjet) than any other nation in the world, you’d expect the European manufacturer to make significant efforts to sell this jet here. However, Airbus hasn’t sold a single A330-800to a US airline. This is especially surprising considering that the prior A330-200 has been reasonably successful in the country, being operated by Delta, Hawaiian, and, previously, American Airlines.
United Airlines currently flies 53 aging Boeing 767s, but has committed to the 787 to replace these planes. Hawaiian Airlines, a current A330-200 operator, ordered Boeing 787-9s to replace its Airbus widebodies, although these planes are now slated to remain in service while the Dreamliners get transferred to Alaska Airlines. For American Airlines, meanwhile, its 767 and A330 fleets were fully retired during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the 787 serving as their replacement.
Only four airlines in the US operate passenger widebodies in scheduled service, and by and large, they have opted for the similarly sized Boeing 787. This is despite the fact that these planes are replacing the Boeing 767 or Airbus A330, which are optimized for medium-haul routes, similar to the Airbus A330neo. Notably, Hawaiian Airlines formerly held orders for six Airbus A330-800s, but cancelled them in favor of the Dreamliners.
Why Delta Air Lines Isn’t Buying Them
Photo: Minh K Tran | Shutterstock
Delta Air Lines is the largest operator of the Airbus A330-900 in the world and the largest operator of the A330 series as a whole. It operates 11 A330-200s, 31 A330-300s, and 37 A330-900s with two more on order, but has never ordered the A330-800, and has not announced plans to obtain more A330neos. What’s surprising is that the A330-900s were slated to partially replace the Boeing 767-300ER fleet, an aircraft significantly smaller than the A330-900.
You’d expect Delta to replace these aircraft with the A330-800, given that it would be far closer in size to the 767. However, going with the larger A330-900 instead was a conscious choice. Delta is looking to upgauge its entire network, replacing A320s and 737s with A321neos and 737 MAX 10s, while 767s are to be replaced with larger widebodies. Delta is looking to lower per-seat economics, and larger aircraft variants are cheaper to operate per-seat than smaller variants.
Aircraft Types In Service With Delta
Aircraft Types On Order By Delta
Airbus A220-100
Airbus A220-300
Airbus A220-300
Airbus A321neo
Airbus A319-100
Airbus A330-900
Airbus A320-200
Airbus A350-900
Airbus A321-200
Airbus A350-1000
Airbus A321neo
Boeing 737 MAX 10
Airbus A330-200
Airbus A330-300
Airbus A330-900
Airbus A350-900
Boeing 717-200
Boeing 737-800
Boeing 737-900ER
Boeing 757-200
Boeing 757-300
Boeing 767-300ER
Boeing 767-400ER
Delta only has two A330-900s left on order. It’s expected that at least part of its remaining A350 order will displace existing A330-900s that can replace the remaining 767-300ERs, which would again be a system-wide upgauge. Meanwhile, it’s been heavily speculated that the Atlanta-based carrier is looking to order Boeing 787-10s. With a possible delivery date in the early 2030s, these could replace older A330s and the Boeing 767-400ER, while also being a significant upgauge over both types.
Why The Airbus A330-800 Is Not Selling
Photo: Markus Mainka I Shutterstock
In the US, Delta is looking to upgauge its entire network, while other carriers are focusing on the Boeing 787. However, the A330-800 has also sold poorly around the world, with only eight total orders, while the A330-900 has received nearly 440. Seven have already been delivered: four to Kuwait Airways, two to Uganda Airlines, and one to Air Greenland. One more example is reported to have been ordered in an executive configuration.
The A330-800 is a direct replacement for the Airbus A330-200, which, in Delta’s premium-heavy configuration, seats 223 passengers. At the other end of the spectrum, Hawaiian’s leisure-focused A330-200s seat 278. With the new winglets and more efficient Rolls-Royce Trent 7000, the A330-800 now has a range of 8,100 NM (15,000 km) at a Maximum Takeoff Weight of 251 tonnes, and this is the issue.
The A330-200 that the A330-800 is based on was developed as a shrink of the original A330-300 (replaced by the A330-900). As such, the A330-200/800 is more expensive to operate per-seat than its larger counterparts. In the past, the A330-200 sold due to its additional range, but as the A330-300 grew more capable, sales for the A330-200 dried up. With the A330-900 now having up to 7,350 NM (13,600 km) of range, almost no airline is willing to sacrifice economics for the extra miles.
The Decline Of Short-Fuselage Variants
Photo: Wirestock Creators | Shutterstock
In airliner design, manufacturers typically create the base design (Airbus A320, Boeing 757-200, Airbus A330-300, Boeing 777-200), then they will either shrink the fuselage (Airbus A319, Airbus A330-200) or stretch the fuselage (Boeing 757-300, Boeing 777-300). Shrinking typically results in a more capable plane with higher per-seat costs, while a stretched variant boasts the best per-seat costs but also has less range.
Manufacturers don’t always develop their aircraft in this manner (both Airbus A350 variants are optimized for their size), but this is typically how commercial aircraft are designed. This approach generally proved successful, as the A330-200 made up 46% of passenger A330ceo sales, while the A319, A320, and A321 were all popular. For first-generation A320 variants, only the A318 was a sales flop, with this variant being a shrink of a shrink.
Today, however, the A330-800 is far from the only reengined shrink that’s been unpopular. The A319neo has only received 57 orders, while slightly over 300 orders have been received for the Boeing 737 MAX 7. The 777-8’s development has been paused, and even sales for the Boeing 787-8 have slowed down dramatically. As the larger version of an airliner becomes more capable, such as during a re-engine program, demand for the shrink disappears.
Why Airbus Doesn’t Care About Selling A330-800s
Photo: EA Photography | Shutterstock
From a manufacturer’s position, a shrink allows you to capture a broader segment of the market by addressing the shortcomings of the original model. However, such jets are priced lower than a larger model, but cost practically the same to produce, thereby generating lower profit margins. Manufacturers prefer to sell larger variants whenever possible, as they generate the highest profits.
When significant demand exists for a smaller aircraft that is more capable, manufacturers will price it competitively. The sale price is a significant component in whether an airliner wins an order, and, as such, selling an A330-200 may have yielded lower profits than an A330-300 in the past, but this was still preferable over losing an order to the Boeing 767.
With the A330-800, however, airlines aren’t lining up to buy it, and Airbus spent little on developing it. The A330-900 captures nearly all of the market, and this variant generates higher profit margins. As such, Airbus is incentivized to price the A330-900 competitively, while the A330-800 has low demand and generates lower profits, so Airbus likely budges little on pricing. This lowers demand for the A330-800 even further, but Airbus would still rather sell more A330-900s.
The Bottom Line
The Airbus A330-800 has been sold to three airlines. This is the only widebody in Air Greenland’s fleet and is used for flights to Copenhagen, directly replacing an Airbus A330-200. For Kuwait Airways and Uganda Airlines, the type serves as a small, efficient, cheap widebody that has incredible capability. Kuwait Airways also operates the A330-900, making it easier for the airline to integrate it into the fleet.
While the A330-800 has so far proven a sales dud, Airbus is not focused on the variant’s individual orderbook. Rather, Airbus aims to make money on the A330neo program as a whole, and selling more A330-900s appears to be a winning strategy for the European planemaker. As such, the A330-800 will likely go down as one of the industry’s rarest birds, similar to other reengined shrinks like the Airbus A319neo.
Digitizing maintenance and other aircraft records would help streamline MRO visits and transactions, such as lease transfers.
Credit: Chris Rank/Airbus
Years from now, when seamless digital record transfers are as routine as clouds in the sky, many will cite the AOG Technics fraud in 2023 as the event that sparked a fundamental shift in how aviation keeps tabs on aircraft assets. They will be right—sort of. AOG Technics, a London-based company that…
Senior Air Transport & Safety Editor Sean Broderick covers aviation safety, MRO, and the airline business from Aviation Week Network’s Washington, D.C. office.
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Failure To Maintain Lateral Control Of The Helicopter During Takeoff, Which Resulted In A Dynamic Rollover Analysis: The non-certificated pilot of the helicopter reported that the purpose of the flight was to practice takeoff, hover, and landing maneuvers from his private grass field. During takeoff, he increased the engine power and inadvertently applied right cyclic concurrently as he raised the collective. Subsequently, the helicopter’s right skid dug into the ground, resulting in a dynamic rollover.
Delta Air Lines
