Commercial Aviation
Why Did McDonnell Douglas Build The DC-10 With 3 Engines?
If you have heard of the DC-10 Twin, then you might ask a deceptively simple question: why did McDonnell Douglas create the DC-10 with three engines, rather than a more efficient two-engine layout? At first glance, adding a third engine seems unnecessarily complex, particularly as modern long-haul airliners now thrive with only two. Yet this solution was very difficult to implement back in the 1960s for several reasons. It reflected the technological limitations, regulatory climate, and market demands of that era. Understanding why the DC-10 was conceived as a trijet helps illuminate the transition between the early jet age of four-engine giants and today’s era of fuel-efficient twinjets.
In our article, we will explore that history in detail. We will examine the circumstances that led McDonnell Douglas to adopt a three-engine design, the proposed but unrealized DC-10 “Twin,” and the crucial role of ETOPS (Extended-range Twin-Engine Operations Performance Standards) in shaping global aviation. By revisiting the regulatory landscape, airline strategies, and the technical ambitions of the DC-10, we can see how McDonnell Douglas responded to its time, and why the trijet eventually gave way to the twinjet revolution.
What Is The Short Answer?
The short answer is that McDonnell Douglas built the DC-10 with three engines because airline regulations in the 1960s and 1970s did not permit twin-engine widebodies to fly long-distance overwater routes. At the time, a rule known as the “60-minute rule” restricted twinjets from operating more than an hour’s flying time away from a diversion airport. This made them unsuitable for transoceanic and many remote transcontinental services. By fitting three engines, the DC-10 avoided these restrictions and became immediately viable for major international routes, without the need for complex exemptions or unproven regulatory changes.
There were also performance reasons. Jet engine reliability was steadily improving, but not yet to the point where airlines or regulators trusted long-haul operations with only two engines. Having three engines meant airlines could advertise strong safety margins and avoid restrictions. Furthermore, the third engine, mounted in the tail, provided additional thrust for high-altitude takeoffs at airports like 
Denver International Airport and 
Mexico City International Airport, where thinner air challenged aircraft performance. For airlines, that meant versatility and route flexibility, both key selling points in a competitive marketplace.
The DC-10 Twin, which removed the third engine, was studied by McDonnell Douglas in the early 1970s. This variant would have been lighter, more fuel-efficient, and closer in concept to Airbus’ brand-new A300. However, it could not escape the long-haul limitations imposed on two-engine designs. As a result, McDonnell Douglas shelved the idea, leaving the DC-10 as a trijet throughout its career; meanwhile, the Airbus A300 became a popular choice for traveling across Eurasia throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
Other Factors That Influenced The DC-10 Engine Layout
There are several interconnected factors that shaped the DC-10’s three-engine design: regulatory frameworks, market competition, and technical feasibility. The FAA’s “60-minute rule” applied to all twin-engine jets at the time, regardless of size or reliability. Airlines sought an aircraft that could fly longer, cheaper, and could compete with quadjets, such as the Boeing 707, Boeing 747, or Douglas DC-8, and were thus exempt from restrictions. So, the only feasible way was to remove one extra engine. To compete in that space, McDonnell Douglas had little choice but to develop a widebody that was not bound by the same limitations by creating a trijet.
Equally important was engine reliability. In the 1960s, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric were pushing out new high-bypass turbofan engines, but failures were not uncommon. The risk of losing one engine on a two-engine airliner, while rare, was severe enough to justify restrictions. By contrast, with three engines, the DC-10 could afford to lose one and still complete its flight. This design gave airlines confidence when flying across oceans, deserts, or polar regions, the areas where diversion airports were scarce.
Finally, market competition was critical. The DC-10 was not intended to replace the Boeing 747, but to complement it by offering slightly smaller capacity for high-demand routes. To fulfill that role, it needed range and unrestricted routing flexibility, something a twinjet of the time could not provide.
Experts And Airlines On DC-10
Industry observers, former airline staff, and aviation historians broadly agree that the DC-10 Twin was an idea ahead of its time. The proposed variant was seriously studied and even marketed to airlines like North Central, which later became part of Northwest Airlines. As described by Northwest Airlines History, concept art and promotional materials showed how McDonnell Douglas envisioned the two-engine DC-10 serving domestic US routes, competing with the Airbus A300 in Europe. It was a logical idea on paper, but one blocked by regulation.
North Central Airlines showed some interest in the DC-10 Twin, but as a smaller regional player, it lacked the resources to commit to what would essentially be a new aircraft type within its fleet. Other airlines were cautious, too. The economic turbulence of the 1970s, marked by oil shocks and recession, meant carriers avoided experimental models with uncertain regulatory status. Instead, most preferred to buy the established trijet variant that was already certified for global routes.
Enthusiasts on forums such as Quora and Reddit and aviation history sites often speculate that if ETOPS had been introduced a decade earlier, the DC-10 Twin might have found buyers and carved out a profitable niche. But timing is everything in aviation. McDonnell Douglas had already struggled to compete financially with Boeing, and the company lacked the resources to launch an all-new derivative without guaranteed demand. In hindsight, the DC-10 Twin is a fascinating “what if,” but not a viable path for the company at that moment.
DC-10 Vs Other Aircraft From The Same Era
The Airbus A300, launched in 1972, just two years after the DC-10, provides a striking comparison. It was the world’s first twin-engine widebody, but it was designed primarily for short- to medium-haul European routes. Europe’s regulatory environment was slightly more relaxed than the FAA’s, allowing twins to operate further from diversion airports. Thus, Airbus carved a niche where the DC-10 Twin might have competed, such as high-density, medium-range flying that did not require transoceanic capability.
However, the A300 was limited in scope. It could not initially fly across the Atlantic or operate long-haul to Asia. Airlines saw it as a regional supplement rather than a global flagship. By contrast, the DC-10, with three engines, matched the Lockheed L-1011 TriStar and even challenged Boeing’s smaller 747 variants on specific intercontinental routes. In this sense, the trijet design gave McDonnell Douglas more commercial flexibility.
DC-10 vs Early Twin Widebody Design Comparison:
|
Aircraft |
Engines |
First Flight |
Intended Role |
Regulatory Limitations |
Typical Range (early models) |
Passenger Capacity |
Market Impact |
|
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 |
3 (Trijet) |
1970 |
Medium-to-long-haul widebody, transoceanic capable |
None (exempt from 60-minute rule) |
~6,600 km (4,100 mi) |
270–380 |
Became a mainstay for many long-haul airlines, but its reputation is hurt by accidents |
|
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Twin (proposed) |
2 (Twinjet) |
Never built |
Short-to-medium-haul, efficient alternative to trijet |
Restricted by 60-minute rule; could not fly over oceans |
Projected ~5,500 km (3,400 mi) |
250–320 |
Never launched due to lack of regulatory approval and limited demand |
|
Airbus A300 |
2 (Twinjet) |
1972 |
Regional/medium-haul European routes |
Restricted by 60-minute rule; initial flights limited to shorter sectors |
~4,000–5,500 km (2,500–3,400 mi) |
250–300 |
First twin-engine widebody; found niche success, especially in Europe and Asia |
|
Boeing 767 |
2 (Twinjet) |
1981 |
Medium-to-long-haul, transatlantic potential |
Initially subject to 60-minute rule; gained ETOPS-120 in 1985 |
~7,400–9,400 km (4,600–5,800 mi) |
180–260 |
First twinjet certified for long overwater routes; paved way for modern ETOPS |
This table highlights the DC-10 Twin’s limitations compared to its contemporaries, and why the design never advanced. It also illustrated how the Boeing 767, which arrived a decade later, gained ETOPS certification for cross-Atlantic flights. Had the DC-10 arrived a bit later or had the engine design been more reliable, we probably could have seen the DC-10 Twin in action, but history doesn’t like “what ifs”.
When ETOPS arrived in the 1980s, the tables turned. Suddenly, twin-engine jets like the Boeing 767 and Airbus A310 could cross oceans, offering lower operating costs than trijets. This shift rendered the DC-10 Twin obsolete before it could even fly, as newer twinjets occupied the very market McDonnell Douglas had once hoped to fill. The eventual dominance of twinjets highlights just how quickly the regulatory and technological environment changed.
A Slow Decline Of Trijets
While the trijet solved regulatory problems, it introduced new challenges. Mounting an engine in the tail created structural and maintenance complexities. Critics argued that positioning a massive turbofan above the fuselage placed additional stress on the airframe and increased risks in case of failure. Pilots, however, generally adapted well, and the design became iconic not only on the DC-10 but also on its successor, the McDonnell Douglas MD-11, as discussed by the users of the Infinite Flight community.
The DC-10’s safety record also became controversial. Catastrophic accidents such as Turkish Airlines Flight 981 in 1974 and American Airlines Flight 191 in 1979 highlighted design flaws unrelated to engine placement, but they cast a shadow over the aircraft’s reputation. In reality, once these design issues were corrected, the DC-10 went on to have a long and generally safe career. Still, the public perception of the DC-10 as “unsafe” was difficult to shake, and some critics unfairly blamed the trijet layout for its troubled early years.
Had McDonnell Douglas launched the DC-10 Twin, it might have faced its own drawbacks. A two-engine widebody without ETOPS approval would have been restricted to short- and medium-haul flights, directly competing with the Airbus A300 and later Boeing 767. That market was already crowded and would have forced McDonnell Douglas into a more challenging competitive space. Ironically, by avoiding this move, the company prolonged the relevance of the DC-10 as a long-haul workhorse.
The Bottom Line
Ultimately, the DC-10’s three-engine design was a product of its time. McDonnell Douglas needed a widebody aircraft that could compete with Boeing and Lockheed while bypassing regulatory restrictions on twinjets. The trijet provided performance, compliance, and commercial flexibility in an era before ETOPS, ensuring the DC-10 was viable for global service.
At the same time, the unbuilt DC-10 Twin illustrates that McDonnell Douglas saw the potential for a twin-engine future, but the company was constrained by timing and circumstance. Once ETOPS became a reality, twins like the Boeing 767, 777, and Airbus A330 took over the long-haul market, relegating trijets to history and also ousting many quadjets. Yet in the early 1970s, a trijet was the only way forward in the long-haul market dominated by quadjets.
Today, long-range flights are dominated by ETOPS-rated twins like the Boeing 787 and Airbus A350, capable of flying more than six hours from a diversion airport. The DC-10, though now retired from passenger service, continues in limited cargo services and remains an important milestone in aviation history. Its trijet design reflected the best solution available in its time, bridging the gap between the four-engine giants of the 1960s and the twin-engine revolution that defines aviation today.
Conversations about widebody aircraft are currently dominated by the astonishingly impressive advances offered by next-generation jets like the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, 777X, and the Airbus A350. However, airlines like United continue to fly older widebody aircraft while this transition is ongoing. This leads to some quirky and aging aircraft remaining of vital importance for some carriers.
As a result, United now dominates one old widebody variant. Just two other airlines use this aircraft, but none to the same extent as United Airlines. Furthermore, neither of these two airlines is US-based, and they are incredibly unlikely to fly this jet into the United States.
The Widebody Aircraft That United Dominates Ownership Of
The widebody aircraft in question is the 777-200, the shortest low-range version of the Boeing 777. Ch-aviation data procured by Simple Flying reveals that the airline has 17 777-200s in active service. This accounts for the vast majority of the 20 777-200s still flying in the commercial aviation sector.
These jets are old. The youngest is N215UA, a jet that is 24.62 years old. Meanwhile, the carrier has four 777-200s that are over 30 years old (although none that are 31 years old). These are N774UA, N771UA, N773UA and N772UA. The majority of their other 777-200s are between 25 and 30 years old.
The first 777-200 delivered to United Airlines was N777UA. This jet had the honor of flying the first 777 commercial flight a month after its delivery in May 1995, traveling from Heathrow Airport to Washington-Dulles. Aerolopa data reveals that the aircraft was received in a 292-seat three-class layout. This layout included 12 seats in First Class, 49 in “Connoisseur Class”, and 231 in Economy Class. The latter utilized a 2-5-2 layout, the standard for 1990s economy-class widebody aircraft.
Boeing 777-200 Overview
Boeing orders its 777 variants according to fuselage length and range. As such, the 777-200 is the shortest variant and has a lower range than the 777-200ER and 777-200LR. Many consider the 777-200 to be the jet’s first generation, with the second being the -200LR, -300ER and 777F, and the 777X set to be the third generation. This jet made its maiden flight in June 1994, with the first example delivered to United Airlines a year later. Boeing built this variant with US domestic use in mind, although it was later picked up by British Airways and multiple Asian carriers. In total, nine customers purchased a total of 88 777-200s, and the jet primarily competed against the Airbus A330-300. This total had dropped to 55 in active service by 2018.
The table below features essential specifications for the Boeing 777-200 according to Skybrary collected data:
|
Wingspan |
60.9 m |
|---|---|
|
Powerplant |
2 x PW 4077 (342.5 kN) or 2 x GE90-77B (342.5 kN) or 2 x RR Trent 877 (338.1 kN) |
|
Cruising speed |
Mach 0.84 |
|
Range |
5,240 nautical miles |
|
Length |
63.7 m |
|
Three-class seating capacity |
305 |
|
Maximum takeoff weight |
545,000 lb (247,200 kg) |
|
Ceiling |
43,100 ft (13,100 m) |
In 2019, Boeing committed to a permanent shift away from the 777-200. The manufacturer opted to remove the variant from its price listing for 777 variants. During its over two decades on the market, the jet was substantially less successful than the 777-200ER, which had a range of 7,065 nautical miles. First delivered to British Airways in 1997, the jet was eventually received by 33 customers, resulting in a total of 422 deliveries. As such, a much greater quantity has remained in service (338 in 2018). During its service, the jet went through four liveries.
How Does United Airlines Use Its 777-200s
While United purchased its 777-200s with intercontinental routes in mind, these aircraft now rarely leave the United States. The entire 777-200 fleet operates with a high-density configuration, capable of carrying 364 passengers. The configuration features 28 United First seats, arranged in a 2-4-2 configuration with lie-flat bed seats. Next is Economy Plus, which features 102 seats and an extra inch of legroom compared to the 234 economy class seats.
Controversially, this cabin layout only has personal entertainment screens in United First. Other passengers are expected to bring their own personal devices or other forms of in-flight entertainment. Fortunately, the carrier primarily uses the 777-200 for high-capacity, short-haul routes. Included are destinations with a large number of leisure travelers, such as Cancun.
Among the countless passengers who have flown on United Airlines’ 777-200s during their three decades of service is Simple Flying’s flight reviewer, Joe Kunzler. They described the comfort passengers can expect while flying in Economy Class during their trip from San Francisco to Denver, the kind of domestic jetsetting that the 777-200 was designed for: “The seat’s comfort level was OK for a three-hour flight. I did not get an amenity kit, but I had a good view of the mighty 777 wing and a place to put my cell phone… Additionally, I appreciated that I could mold the head cushion to my head, as I can on many narrowbody jetliner seats these days.”
What Is The Future For United 777-200s?
United’s business model is often based around keeping old jets in the skies for as long as possible, reducing the astronomical costs of procuring large numbers of next-generation jets. However, many more United Airlines 777-200s are set to reach the age of 30 by 2026. Even for United, such an age puts a strain on maintenance infrastructures. The 777-200s days are surely numbered.
United has put in orders for 787 Dreamliners, alongside delayed orders for Airbus A350s. This includes 25 firm orders for A350-900s and 10 for A350-1000s. Eventually, these widebody aircraft will bring an end to United Airlines’ need to keep its aging 777-200s in the skies. In a press release from the airline, chairperson Jeff Smisek said, “We look forward to taking delivery of the A350-1000. This is a modern, fuel-efficient and advanced-technology aircraft that our customers and co-workers will enjoy flying. It will be a great addition to our fleet, and will allow us to meet demand on larger, long-haul markets in our world-leading network.”
In line with its tendency to procure older and cheaper aircraft as a stopgap, United is also considering aircraft that many consider obsolete to help it retire more 777-200s. For example, it added four 777-200ERs to its domestic fleet. This will allow the domestic flying duties currently performed by the 777-200 to be fulfilled by newer 777-200ERs, while the incoming 787s and A350s can be utilized on longer and more challenging routes.
United’s 777-200 Replacement Won’t Be The 777X
To Boeing’s frustration, United won’t use the 777X to replace its 777-200s and other retired widebody planes. That is because no US-based airline has displayed an interest in acquiring the 777X. Smaller widebody aircraft, such as the 787 and A350, have proven much more popular, primarily due to their astonishing size. The aircraft characteristics are a fundamental mismatch with the needs of the US domestic aviation market.
Another reason airlines like United are opting out of the 777X program is the decline in trust in Boeing’s ability to deliver on its promises. Ongoing delays, in part caused by the 737 MAX crisis, have meant the originally planned 2020 delivery date is now in the distant past. Catastrophic failures in testing and a workers’ strike have also reduced confidence in Boeing.
Who Else Operates The 777-200?
Data obtained from ch-aviation reveals that there are three 777-200s in the skies beyond those flown by United Airlines. All of these are years younger than United’s 777-200s. Firstly, All Nippon Airways has two 777-200s. JA713A is 20.04 years old, while JA714A is 19.77 years old. All Nippon Airways was one of the airlines that Boeing collaborated with directly in the design of the 777. It first received the aircraft in October 1995. Common routes flown by All Nippon Airways using the 777-200 include Tokyo Haneda to Sapporo and Tokyo Haneda to Fukuoka.
In recent years, All Nippon Airways has gradually reduced the number of 777-200s in its service. Notably, the airline disassembled three of its 777-200s in 2021, as reported by Simple Flying’s Jake Hardiman. This process included disassembling the airframes and salvaging their auxiliary power units. Other All Nippon Airways 777-200s have found quirky uses. For example, in 2021, All Nippon Airways’ 777-200 at Tokyo Haneda was reconfigured as a stationary restaurant, offering business-class and first-class meal services at astonishingly high price points.
The final 777-200 still in service that we haven’t yet mentioned is 5N-BBN, flown by the Nigerian carrier Max Air. This was the first 777-200 acquired by the airline after a deal made in 2023. The aircraft is a rare example of a plane that escaped the notorious Pinal Airpark boneyard and returned to active service. Previously, the aircraft had been operated by Japan Airlines. “Buckle up for extraordinary journeys ahead!” wrote the airline on X. The airline has since used the aircraft to boost capacity on its most popular routes.
TAT Technologies has engineered a remarkable transformation, evolving from an established but previously dispersed and relatively unknown company into a rapidly growing powerhouse that dominates its core fields of activity. Riding the momentum of three consecutive years of double-digit revenue and profit growth and armed with a robust backlog and long-term agreements exceeding $524 million, the company secured $46 million in equity funding in June 2025, accelerating the company into its next phase of strategic expansion across aviation, aerospace, and defense markets.
The funding, predominantly backed by U.S.-based institutional investors, positions TAT as a formidable new force in the American market, with strong access to the aviation Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) supply chain, Maintenance, Repair Overhaul (MRO) services, and the financial community.
From Domestic Defense Origins to Global Leadership
Founded in the 1970s as an Original Equipment Manufacturer for defense aviation, the company has evolved from a niche supplier to a dominant manufacturer and service provider in global aviation maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO). This transformation accelerated through strategic acquisitions in the early 2000s that opened doors to the civil aviation sector, enabling the company to expand its expertise in Thermal systems and components to include support and maintenance of auxiliary power units (APUs) and landing gear components.
The COVID-19 pandemic became a defining period that demonstrated the company’s resilience and strategic agility. While the aviation supply chain faced unprecedented challenges, TAT executed a strategic pivot by signing agreements for maintenance services and supply chains with leading aerospace OEMs, like Honeywell. As the industry navigated the pandemic’s impact, the company obtained certification for Honeywell APUs and acquired a fleet of APUs from the manufacturer. This agreement solidified TAT’s position as a trusted MRO partner and unlocked access to a serviceable market of approximately 22,000 aircraft, representing an annual addressable market size of around $2.5 billion.
Strategic Portfolio Optimization
Concurrent with these growth initiatives, the company streamlined its operations by discontinuing low-volume legacy items and consolidating its Israeli manufacturing footprint into modern facilities, alongside its two facilities in the U.S. This strategic rebalancing has focused resources on high-growth, high-value product lines—thermal-management systems, APUs, and landing gear—where the company now competes directly with the largest OEMs and leading independent service providers worldwide.
As TAT was streamlining its offering, it was simultaneously investing in core offerings, like its established expertise in thermal systems, to bolster its competitive advantages. TAT’s research and development department drives innovation of new thermal systems for Next Gen aircraft, such as Electric Take Off and Landing (eVTOL), and also for complete thermal solutions for aviation rather than just a heat exchanger component. This ongoing innovation initiative is key to optimizing the company’s offerings for the global aviation industry.
Expanding Customer Base and Market Reach
Today’s client portfolio reflects this strategic evolution, encompassing airframe manufacturers such as Boeing, Embraer, and Textron, over 100 commercial carriers, including American Airlines, Japan Airlines, LATAM, and Korean Air, as well as cargo operators like FedEx, UPS, and DHL. Military and government clients include air forces worldwide, as well as OEMs and integrators such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing Defense, and RTX.
The company’s customer-focused approach has yielded significant contract wins, including a five-year extension of an APU MRO service agreement with a leading global Cargo carrier. The agreement, initially covering the customer’s U.S. fleet of Boeing 767 and 757 aircraft, has been expanded to encompass the carrier’s global fleet, including Boeing 777, 737, and Airbus A320 aircraft. This contract is valued between $40 million and $55 million over the five-year term, with an exceptional lead time for the customer.
Focused Growth Strategy
The fresh capital will fuel both organic expansion and targeted acquisition activity, with a clear vision to extend market leadership and seize opportunities in new geographies and technologies. To support this ambition, TAT has established a group management team headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Charlotte’s selection as the U.S. headquarters leverages the city’s thriving aerospace ecosystem and talent pool, making it an ideal base for expanded American operations. The company has implemented a comprehensive employee development program, investing in training and skill development to support both individual growth and enterprise advancement. This strategic positioning enhances TAT’s ability to pursue long-term contracts and opportunities with both existing customers and new prospects in the world’s largest aerospace market.
Investment Thesis Validation
The company’s financial performance has validated its strategic approach, delivering growth that has outpaced the broader industry recovery. This track record, combined with a strengthened balance sheet from the recent funding round, creates compelling value propositions for multiple stakeholder groups.
For prospective customers, these developments translate to enhanced confidence in TAT’s ability to deliver comprehensive MRO solutions at scale. The expanded U.S. presence and enhanced financial resources ensure service continuity and the capacity to handle larger, more complex maintenance programs.
The stronger balance sheet also positions the company for potential inorganic growth opportunities. For prospective acquisition targets and merger partners, TAT represents a well-capitalized platform.
Looking Forward
With fresh resources, an expanded U.S. footprint, and a proven track record of strategic execution, TAT Technologies stands ready to capitalize on the sector’s growth trajectory.
The combination of nearly seven decades of aerospace OEM heritage and comprehensive MRO capabilities—now enhanced by fresh capital and a sharpened strategic focus—creates a unique market position. As fleets age and maintenance requirements grow more complex, the company’s deep technical expertise in thermal management systems, APUs, and landing gear is further bolstered by its pioneering work in Innovative Systems.
As a leader in developing next generation universal cooling solutions for electric, hybrid, and hydrogen-powered platforms, the company is helping shape the future of aerospace. Backed by strong financial resources and an expanding U.S. footprint, TAT is poised to capture significant value across commercial and defense markets.
For more information, please visit TAT Technologies’ website.
The Boeing 787 Dreamliner (specifically the Boeing 787-9 variant) is currently the most popular widebody aircraft on the market. It was built to replace the Boeing 767, complement the Boeing 777, and compete with the Airbus A330 (now A330neo) and the A350 that entered service four years after the Dreamliner. It also helped to doom the Airbus A380 as well as the Boeing 747-8i.
Even though Boeing slashed production of the 787 during the pandemic by shutting the assembly line in Seattle, it is currently being delivered in higher numbers than other widebody aircraft. Boeing is also working to expand its production in North Charleston, South Carolina, and ramp up production. Here is what to know about the Boeing 787’s deliveries in 2025 and beyond.
The Number Of Boeing 787s Delivered By Mid-2025
As of mid-2025, Boeing’s records show it has a total unfulfilled backlog of 993 Boeing 787s on order from a total of 2,199 firm orders. This has made the Boeing 787 the best-selling widebody aircraft in history. But while Boeing wins that accolade, Airbus’ A320 family is the best-selling commercial jet in history and is becoming the most delivered commercial jet.
When it comes to deliveries, Boeing has delivered 399 of its 787-8 variant Dreamliners, 681 of its mid-sized 787-9s, and 126 of the 787-10s. That is a total of 1,206 Boeing 787s delivered since the first example entered service in 2011. While the rival Airbus A350, which entered service in 2015, has proven to be a popular aircraft, the Dreamliner has continued to outperform it in both orders and deliveries. A total of 1,428 A350s have been ordered, of which 669 have been delivered.
Orders for the Dreamliner continue to roll in, and in 2025, Boeing has amassed a total of 243 new orders for its Dreamliners. These are thanks in large part to Qatar Airways, which ordered 120 new 787s, while British Airways and Korean Air have also placed substantial orders. All orders have been for its 787-9 and 787-10 variants, and none are for the 787-8.
Boeing’s Past Dreamliner Delivery Rate
Before the pandemic, the Boeing 787 was delivered in much larger numbers. Boeing was building them in both Everett in Seattle, and in North Charleston. In 2019, the last “normal” production year for the Dreamliner, Boeing delivered a total of 158 aircraft. In 2020, that dropped to just 53 and to only 14 examples in 2021. In the pandemic, Boeing shut down its Seattle assembly line for the 787.
In 2022, deliveries recovered somewhat to 31 examples and grew to around half the prepandemic rate of 73 in 2023. 2024 was another bad year for Boeing deliveries, with its total deliveries falling back to just 348 commercial aircraft (Airbus delivered 766 that year). In 2024, Boeing delivered 51 Dreamliners, although it has delivered 45 by mid-year 2025.
|
Boeing 787 Dreamliner deliveries by year since 2019 (per Boeing) |
|||
|---|---|---|---|
|
2019 |
158 |
2024 |
51 |
|
2020 |
53 |
2025 (mid-year) |
45 |
|
2021 |
14 |
2025 (estimated) |
75-80 |
|
2022 |
31 |
Planned end of 2025 rate |
84 (seven per month) |
|
2023 |
73 |
Total delivered (mid-2025) |
1,206 |
While 2019 was the last “normal” production year for the Dreamliner, 2018 was the last “normal” year for Boeing’s commercial aircraft overall. In 2019, the second Boeing 737 MAX crashed, and Boeing’s deliveries have not recovered since. From 2015-2017, Boeing delivered between 748 and 763 aircraft, rising to 806 in 2018. Since then, the most it has delivered was in 2023, when it shipped 528 aircraft.
Boeing’s Planned 2025 Dreamliner Deliveries
According to Flight Plan, Boeing plans to ramp up production of the 787 to seven aircraft monthly by the end of 2025. Previously, Boeing’s 787 production rate was five a month. For Boeing, one big issue presently is Lufthansa’s Allegris seating, where some of its new business class seats lack FAA certification.
At the start of 2025, Boeing projected deliveries of 75 to 80 Dreamliners in 2025. That number includes both new-build jets and those currently in inventory that it has been unable to deliver. At the start of 2025, Boeing had an estimated 25 Boeing 787s built in previous years but stored before delivery. If those jets are delivered, then Boeing’s 2025 production would be 50-55 new aircraft.
|
787 orders and deliveries per Boeing mid-2025 |
Boeing 787-8 |
Boeing 787-9 |
Boeing 787-10 |
Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Total number ordered (per Boeing, may include orders later canceled) |
671 |
1,557 |
433 |
2,661 (2,199 firm orders) |
|
Total delivered |
399 |
681 |
126 |
1,206 |
|
Back order (July 2025) |
28 |
695 |
270 |
993 |
Given that Boeing managed to deliver 45 Dreamliners in the first half of 2025 and its annual production is around 36 over that period, it suggests Boeing has managed to move some of its stored aircraft. However, these do not appear to be Lufthansa aircraft, as Boeing does not list having made any deliveries to Lufthansa in the first six months. Lufthansa is known to have around 15 Boeing 787s built, but refused delivery on account of the FAA not granting the needed certification.
Ramping Up Boeing 787 Deliveries
In 2019, Boeing was delivering the Dreamliner at a rate of 14 per month; by the start of 2025, that was just five per month, with plans to increase it to seven per month. Even so, that is only half of the pre-pandemic levels. Part of the issue is that Boeing is trying to restore its world-class quality control to its aircraft to ensure things like the Boeing 737 MAX crashes and the Alaska Airlines door plug blowout don’t happen again.
In August 2025, Leeham News stated the $1 billion expansion of its Charleston production site that will double the final assembly line capacity for the 787. It adds that Boeing has reached a rate of seven 787s per month and now plans to produce them at a rate of ten per month sometime in 2026. After that, it plans to continue ramping up production beyond what it achieved in 2019.
|
Boeing 787 Dreamliner production rate |
|
|---|---|
|
Beginning 2025 |
5 per month |
|
End 2025 |
7 per month |
|
2026 |
10 per month |
|
From 2028 |
16 per month (available capacity) |
Leeham News says that when the expansion is finished in 2028, Boeing will have the capacity to reach a rate of 16 per month. If Boeing could deliver the aircraft at a rate of 16 per month, that would translate to 192 aircraft a year.
Story Of The Boeing 787-8
The Boeing 787-8 was the first to debut, and it attracted a large percentage of the orders. However, the 787-9 hit the market in 2014, and since then it has attracted more orders, with new orders for the Boeing 787-8 drying up over time. Boeing only has 28 orders for the 787-8 remaining on its order book, over half (15) of which are for Emirates.
Since 2020, Boeing has only recorded eight new orders for the 787-8 variant. This suggests that the Boeing 787-8 may soon go out of production. Increased Dreamliner production means more 787-9s and 787-10s and not 787-8s. One of the reasons why the 787-9 is more popular is that the wings are better optimized for that variant than the 787-8 or 787-10.
|
Boeing 787-8 |
Boeing 787-9 |
Boeing 787-10 |
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
Range |
7,305 nautical miles |
7,565 nautical miles |
6,330 nautical miles |
|
Typical 3-class seating |
248 |
296 |
336 |
|
Length |
186 feet |
206 feet |
224 feet |
The 787-9 is the longest ranged variant with a range of 7,565 nautical miles, compared with the 787-8’s 7,305 nautical mile range and the 787-10’s reduced 6,330 nautical mile range. The 787-8 is being outcompeted by both the 787-9 and the cheaper-to-operate but still large and long-range Airbus A321XLR. The A321XLR comes with a range of 4,700 nautical miles.
Boeing 787 Dreamliner Production To Recover By 2028
After a decade-long dip in production due to the pandemic and lingering concerns with Boeing’s quality controls, the Dreamliner appears set to meet and even exceed its previous delivery rates around 2028. In 2025, the Dreamliner’s deliveries will remain around half that of pre-pandemic numbers but above that of 2024.
The 2025 final delivery rate will hinge to some degree on when Boeing can move the already-built Lufthansa Dreamliners and any others it has lying around. The future appears bright for the Dreamliner (except the 787-8) with large numbers of orders continuing to be placed and Boeing looking to restore its previously high levels of production. One of the major areas of uncertainty for the Dreamliner and Boeing aircraft in general is the ongoing trade war.
In March 2025, the CEO of the massive aircraft lessor, AerCap, stated that in a “worst case” scenario with reciprocal tariffs being placed, Boeing would be cut out of the international market. Airbus would take the world’s aviation market, leaving Boeing with the United States. In June, China banned its airlines from accepting Boeing aircraft and even returned some that had been delivered. And yet, in August, there are rumors that China may be about to place a large order for 500 Boeing aircraft. The bottom line is that the situation is turbulent and unpredictable.
- Stock Code
-
BA
- Business Type
-
Planemaker
- Date Founded
-
July 15, 1916
- CEO
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Kelly Ortberg
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