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New Images Provide Clearest View Yet of Damage to U.S.-made AN/FPS-132 Early Warning Radar in Qatar

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The imagery offers a closer look at the damage to the giant phased-array AN/FPS-132 radar struck during Iran’s attack on Qatar last month.

Newly published photos by Al Jazeera circulated online offer the clearest view yet t0 the damage sustained by the U.S.-made AN/FPS-132 Block 5 (SSPARS) ballistic missile early-warning radar in Qatar which was hit by an Iranian retaliatory strike last month.

The radar complex in Qatar, a high-value fixed-site phased-array system that forms part of the Gulf’s wider missile warning architecture, is located at Al Udeid Air Base, a key U.S. base in the region that has been targeted multiple times by Tehran’s missiles during the conflict sparked by the U.S. and Israeli air campaign against Iran.

Although the images themselves don’t allow to assess the full extent of the damage or the radar’s current operational status, they appear consistent with earlier reporting, based on satellite imagery, that suggested at least part of the radar installation had been hit. Earlier analysis had pointed to damage to one face of the radar, with debris and signs consistent with firefighting activity visible at the site.

Again, the photos show burnt components and wiring, and while the damage is evident, it is impossible to determine whether the radar can be repaired or how long the repairs would take, and caution remains necessary. So far, there hasn’t been any official statement about the damage hence we don’t know how badly the radar was hit or whether it remains operational in some degraded mode. 

Still, it’s worth highlighting that even partial damage to such a radar can matter. It does not necessarily mean the entire network is blinded, especially in a region where there is significant redundancy, but it can still degrade warning coverage, reduce tracking quality, and complicate the response to follow-on missile or drone attacks.

The AN/FPS-132 Block 5 is not just a radar in the regional air-defense picture, but a major fixed-site ballistic missile early warning system, one of the largest and most strategically important sensors deployed in the region. 

According to the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the radar was sold to Qatar to provide a “permanent defensive capability” for the peninsula, protect its economic infrastructure and help the country counter current and future threats in the region. The package included not only the radar itself, but also communications equipment, encryption devices, support and test equipment, training, and U.S. government and contractor engineering and logistics support. Raytheon was the primary contractor.

While some media outlets describe the radar complex as U.S.-operated, the radar was acquired by Qatar through a Foreign Military Sale and is therefore, technically, Qatari-owned and U.S.-made, although it is reasonable to assume that both Qatari and U.S. personnel work on the system. At the same time, the radar is said to be part of the broader U.S.- and allied-backed missile warning architecture in the Gulf, meaning it is tightly integrated into regional air and missile defense networks.

According to publicly available details, the system employs three electronically steered phased-array faces providing 360-degree azimuth coverage and is capable of detecting ballistic missiles at a maximum range of 5,000 km. The same source says the radar supports missile warning, missile defense, and space situational awareness, placing it within the broader regional air and missile defense architecture rather than a narrow point-defense role.

Whatever, what makes the strike particularly important is the type of capability involved, a capability worth $1.1B in 2013, that can’t be repositioned or replaced more easily. Hence, there’s something symbolic in the giant Qatari radar.

However, the attack on this radar site was not an isolated action.

Since the beginning of Operation Epic Fury, Iran has consistently targeted multiple radar systems in the Middle East region, including several AN/TPY-2 sites, with the aim to degrade the warning and tracking architecture supporting the region’s integrated air and missile defense posture.


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